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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/03/2011

Accident number: 675

Accident time: 10:15

Accident Date: 20/07/2009

Where it occurred: MF: E41, AL
SHAJARAH 3,
ALRAMTHA Province

Country: Jordan

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M14 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard
Date last modified: 06/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: 35.94638 E

Map north: 32.685068 N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
standing to excavate (?)
use of rake (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
non injurious accident (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing

1

Accident report
A PDF report of this accident was made available by the demining group involved in late
2010. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.
Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.
The internal investigation report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
[Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN
TASK NAME AL SHAJARAH 3 (412), NORTH BORDER PROJECT, EAST SECTOR
GRID REF: 32.685068 N, 35.94638 E, AL SHAJARAH 3
MINEFIELD NO.- 412, MINEFIELD TASK ID- E 412 AL SHAJARAH 3. SECTOR: - EAST
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY [Name removed].
DEMINER: [the Victim]. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/04/1960: NIC NO: [Removed]
SECTION COMMANDER: [Name removed]. TEAM LEADER: [Name removed].
TIME OF INCIDENT: 10:15 AM: DATE OF INCIDENT: 20 JULY 2009
NATURE OF INJURY: No Injury. TYPE OF MINE: Anti Personnel M 14

IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT Monday, 20 July 2009
[The following is extracted from IMSMA-style tick-box forms.]
Part 1 – Description of the incident
1) Organisation name: [Demining group], JORDAN Team No: Metal Detector 1.
2) Incident date: 20/07/2009; Time: 10: 15 AM
3) Location of incident: EAST SECTOR; Province: ALRAMTHA; Village: AL SHAJARAH;
Project or task No: E 412 ALSHAJARAH 3
4) Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed].
5) Type of incident: M14 AP MINE: uncontrolled detonation of a mine/UXO
6) Device was detonated by: deminer
7) Device detonated while raking with Heavy Rake: investigating.
8) Device was found in an area classified as a hazardous area.
9) Narrative: While the deminer was trying to investigate a signal using the heavy RAKE and
after he pinpointed it , and finished with the light RAKE the deminer hit the non visible AP
mine (M14) by the heavy RAKE on the pressure plate which initiated the mine 2.2 metres
away from the deminer.
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[Picture of the accident site.]
Part 2: Injuries
10) No injuries.
11) No names of Victims to list. Deminer at the time was [Name removed].
Part 3: Equipment damage
12) No damage to equipment.
13) No damaged equipment to list.
14) No damage to publicly owned property.
Part 4: Explosive hazard
15) AP blast mine, buried, and “determined by” raking.
16) Mine type: M14
17) Crater depth approx 15cm, Width approx 40cm.
Part 5: Site conditions
18) The ground was soft and flat.
The weather was clear and hot
The vegetation was “heavy” grass.
Part 6: Team and Task details
21) Victim was part of a team that had been working at the task for one month and working on
the day for 3 hrs and 15 minutes.
22) Tripwire feeler was not used.
23) Hand tool used: Heavy rake.
24) PPE used was a “vest” and “visor”.
Part 7: Medical and First aid
Medical treatment was not required
26) There was a medic, stretcher. Ambulance, safety vehicle and radio at the accident site.
27) A mine incident drill was carried out.
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28) Time from the accident to the Section Medical Point was one minute. 29 minutes were
spend ascertaining the extent of injury. The victim was then evacuated to hospital for
confirmation. The evacuation by ambulance took 22 minutes.
Attachments: statements, photographs, medical report. [No medical report made available.]
[A photograph showed the deminer who detonated the mine apparently uninjured.]

Observations and Recommendations
The incident happened due to an individual mistake that the deminer didn’t approach the mine
in the proper way, more than that the mine found on a depth of 35 cm .
Signed: Operations Coordinator, [Name removed], 20 July 2009

Victim Report
Victim number: 858

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 49

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes
Time to hospital: 52 minutes

Compensation:
Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask
visor, blast boots

Mask Visor
blast boots

Summary of injuries: No injuries recorded.
COMMENT: No medical report was made available.

Statements
Statement 1
Name: [Name of Deminer involved]. Position: Deminer (Cause of Blast).
As I was working on SML B after working on the centre lane I started entering to a new cluster
which includes 4 AP mines, I put the pinpoint to start working and didn’t find any signal in that
box although I doubted the existence of the centre mine in its expected place inside the box
where there were no signal, then I got back and worked on the same box and decided to go
deeper in the ground using the heavy rake to remove the sand. Then the mine blasted at 10:
15 am. I got out of the field walking then I was evacuated to the hospital.
Answers to Investigator Questions:
Yes, the digging depth was 30 cm when the blast happened.
Yes, I know that the metal detector gives a signal to 22 cm depth.
Yes, it happened with me before that the detector didn’t give a signal but when I dig I found
the mine at 10 cm depth.
Yes, sometimes I feel that the detector I work on # 44 gives wrong information.
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Statement 2
Name: [Name removed]. Position: Section Commander.
The team leader gave all the team the morning safety brief, then I gave it to my group and
some work instructions then I distributed them to their sites. The de-miner [involved in the
accident] was on the SML B, I identified the cluster place to him and he entered to work on it,
then I went to the other de-miners. I went back to him and found him working on 20 cm depth
and using the detector but found no signal. He started digging deeper and I left him, and while
I’m leaving a blast happened at his site. I informed the medic team about the accident and the
team leader. He was fine got out of his site walking.

Statement 3
Name: [Name removed]. Position: Team leader.
I was supervising the group in task 413 and the section commander [name removed] was
with the group in 412. At 10:15 am I heard a sound of explosion from [Name removed]’s area
of responsibility, I went there and informed the people involved. We evacuated the injured and
the medic team made him a first aid he was fine and didn’t suffer from anything. The accident
was in lane 6 SML B. The reason of the accident was because of hitting the ground with the
heavy rake and the mine was at 35 cm depth which caused the blast although he was
working according to the procedures.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the
deminer was working to SOPs and that the procedures he was using prevented him suffering
injury. The use of the long rake may have made a detonation more likely to happen, but the
distance that it imposed between the deminer and the seat of the initiation was enough to
prevent any injury (with this small mine).
The secondary cause is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because, despite the statements
and the narrative, in the photograph of the blast crater there is no evidence of any excavation
having been conducted to 20cm around that area before the blast occurred. The mine was
almost certainly initiated by “hacking” at the ground with the heavy rake, which is not
approved in the demining group’s SOPs.
The demining group who made this report available is thanked for its transparency and its
professional concern to share lessons that can be learned from accidents. This record, along
with several other records where rakes were used, provide compelling evidence that the
controlled use of rakes can be both effective and safe.
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